



> Smart
Contract

Audit #

THUNDER ISLANDS

Feb 05
2022



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METHODOLOGY

MAIN TESTS LIST:

- ◆ Best code practices
- ◆ ERC20/BEP20 compliance (if applicable)
- ◆ FA2 compliance (if applicable)
- ◆ Logical bugs
- ◆ General Denial Of Service(DOS)
- ◆ Locked ether
- ◆ Private data leaks
- ◆ Using components with known vulns
- ◆ Weak PRNG
- ◆ Unused vars
- ◆ Unchecked call return method
- ◆ Code with no effects
- ◆ Pool Asset Security (backdoors in the underlying ERC-20)
- ◆ Function visibility
- ◆ Use of deprecated functions
- ◆ Authorization issues
- ◆ Re-entrancy
- ◆ Arithmetic Over/Under Flows
- ◆ Hidden Malicious Code
- ◆ External Contract Referencing
- ◆ Short Address/ Parameter Attack
- ◆ Race Conditions / Front Running
- ◆ Uninitialized Storage Pointers
- ◆ Floating Points and Precision
- ◆ Signatures Replay

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

AUCTION.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:


- ◆ isVisible()

Function can be declared external
- ◆ getTime()

Function can be declared external
- ◆ getHighestBid()

Function can be declared external
- ◆ setTimestampAdmin(uint256 _endTimeStamp)

Function should emit an event. Function can be declared external



Pic. 1.1

Auction.sol

- ◆ `changeAdmin(address newAdminAddress)`
Function should emit an event. Function can be declared external. Function should check for 0 address
- ◆ `setNewCurrentBid()`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getNeededAllowancePaytoken()`
Function can be declared external

PAYABLE/WARNING

- ◆ `placeBid()`
Since `er721Instance` is fully controlled by user a malicious contract can be provided to trigger re-entrancy at line 161. This attack can be used to trigger calls at lines 157,158,159 and charge user multiple times for single trade. NFT should be transferred before sending payment tokens and also `nonReentrant` modifier should be added for security.

Tokens in

- ◆ `cancelAuction()`
Function can be declared external

PAYABLE/WARNING

- ◆ `_calculateFee(uint amount)`
Should process boolean values, that `SafeMath` methods return

NFT out

PAYABLE

- ◆ `withdraw()`
Function should check that auction type is `Type.Auction`. Check at line 199 is redundant. Typo in error at line 229. Function can be declared external

NFT out, tokens out

PAYABLE/WARNING

```
◆ onERC721Received(  
  address _operator,  
  address _from,  
  uint256 _tokenId,  
  bytes calldata _data  
)
```

Function can be called by anyone, which means any user can provide a non valid er721 and ruin a deployed contract. We suggest that erc721 address and token Id should be passed in contract's constructor and verified in this method. Also a good solution is to transfer an NFT in the same tx when creating auction


NFT in

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

AUCTIONFACTORY.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `changeAdmin(address newAdminAddress)`
 Function should emit an event.
 Function can be declared external.
 Function should check for 0 address
- ◆ `changePaytoken(address newPaytokenAddress)`
 Function should emit an event.
 Function can be declared external.
 Function should check for 0 address



Pic. 1.2

AuctionFactory.sol

- ◆ `createAuction(`
 - `uint256 duration,`
 - `uint256 buyValue,`
 - `Type _type``)`

Function can be optimized via cloning contracts instead of creating a new one with constructor. See <https://blog.openzeppelin.com/workshop-recap-cheap-contract-deployment-through-clones/>. Function can be declared external

- ◆ `allAuctions()`

Function can be declared external

- ◆ `userAuctions(address userAddress)`


Function can be declared external

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

MARKETPLACE.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `buy(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 count)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_changeOwnersForTokens(uint256 collectionIndex, address buyer, uint256 count)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_delegateMoney(uint256 totalPrice, uint256 unspentAmount)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_delegateMoney(uint256 totalPrice, uint256 unspentAmount)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `changePayToken(address newAddress)`
Vulnerabilities not detected




Pic. 1.3
Marketplace.sol

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

MYTOKEN.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `tokenURI()`
Function can be declared external
- ◆ `mint(address toAddress)`
Function can be declared external
- ◆ `mintMany(address toAddress, uint256 tokenCount)`
Function can be declared external
- ◆ `multiTransferFrom(address from, address[] memory adresses, uint256 tokenCount, uint256 tokenStartIndex)`
Function can be declared external




Pic. 1.4
MyToken.sol

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT STAKING.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `getMaxExpeditionId()`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getExpeditionList()`
Function can be declared external
- ◆ `getExpeditionArtefactsIds(uint256 expeditionId, address tokenAddress)`
Function can be declared external
- ◆ `getExpeditionTokenId(uint256 expeditionId, address tokenAddress, uint256 index)`
Vulnerabilities not detected



Pic. 1.5
Staking.sol

- ◆ rewardInfoBeforeStake(address artifactAddress)

Function can be declared external

PAYABLE/WARNING

- ◆ stake(OneArtefact[] calldata inputArtefacts)
- Function can be optimized via combining for loops together

NFT in

- ◆ doesExpeditionContainTokenAddress(uint256 expeditionId, address tokenAddress)

Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ getMinCountArtefactInExpeditionForSet(uint256 expeditionId, uint256 setId)

Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ cancelExpedition(uint256 expeditionId)
- Function should emit an event. Function should be declared external

NFT out

- ◆ decreaseCountArtefactInExpeditionForSet(uint256 expeditionId, uint256 setId, uint256 decreaseCount)

Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ reward(uint256 expeditionId)
- Function should emit an event


Tokens out, NFT out

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

MARKETPLACEHELPERS/CASHBACK.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `cashbackMakeCashback(uint256 totalPrice)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `cashbackOnBuy(address buyer, uint256 totalPrice)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_addToPool(uint256 poolIndex, address buyer)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_getCurrentPool(address buyer)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_sendToParticipants(address[] memory participants, uint256 amount)`
User pays too much fees due to «for» loop. We suggest that function should be optimized so users can claim their cash back by themselves instead of paying for others.



Pic. 1.6


marketplaceHelpers/
Cashback.sol

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

MARKETPLACEHELPERS/ MANAGECOLLECTIONS. SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `collectionGetPriceForCount(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 count)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `collectionGetTokenToSale(uint256 collectionIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `collectionOnTokenBuy(uint256 collectionIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_collectionIncreaseCounter(uint256 collectionIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `_collectionDecreaseCountToSale(uint256 collectionIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected



Pic. 1.7
marketplaceHelpers/
ManageCollections.sol

- ◆ `collectionAdd(`
 `address NFTAddress,`
 `address NFTOwner,`
 `uint256 priceInDollars,`
 `uint256 timestampStartOfSale,`
 `uint256 countToSale,`
 `uint256 startIndex`
 `)`

We suggest that this function should check for NFTOwner allowance of NFTs to this SC address. So buy function in marketplace won't revert. Function should emit an event.

- ◆ `maxCollectionId()`
Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ `collectionRemove(uint256 collectionIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ `collectionChangeTotalCountToSale(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 totalCountToSale)`
Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ `collectionChangePrice(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 price)`
Vulnerabilities not detected

- ◆ `collectionChangeStartDate(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 timestamp)`
Collection start date is not utilized by Marketplace SC


- ◆ `ollectionChangeCurrentTokenToSale(uint256 collectionIndex, uint256 currentTokenToSale)`
Vulnerabilities not detected

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

STAKINGHELPERS/REWARDS.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `getRewardAddress(address artefactAddress, uint256 index)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getRewardAmount(address artefactAddress, address tokenAddress)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getArtefactTokenAddressesAndAmounts(address artifactAddress)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `ewardForAddressExists(address artefactAddress)`
Vulnerabilities not detected



Pic. 1.8
stakingHelpers/
Rewards.sol


- ◆ `addOneReward(address artefactAddress, address rewardAddress, uint256 rewardAmount)`
Function should emit an event
- ◆ `clearRewards(address artefactAddress)`
Function should emit an event
- ◆ `saveReward(address artefactAddress, OneReward[] memory inputRewards)`
Vulnerabilities not detected

STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT

STAKINGHELPERS/ SETBONUS.SOL

CONTRACT METHODS ANALYSIS:

- ◆ `getMaxSetId()`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getArtefactInSet(uint256 setId, uint256 artefactIndex)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getArtefactsCountInSet(uint256 setId)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `getRewardAmountInSet(uint256 setId, address resourceAddress)`
Vulnerabilities not detected



Pic. 1.9
stakingHelpers/
SetBonus.sol

- ◆ `artefactsSatisfiedSet(address[] memory userArtefacts, uint256 setId)`
Vulnerabilities not detected
- ◆ `saveSet(address[] memory artefactAddresses, OneReward[] memory inputRewards)`
Function should emit an event
- ◆ `deleteSet(uint256 setId)`
Function should emit an event

VERIFICATION CHECK SUMS

Contract Name	Solc version	Optimisation	Bytecode hash (SHA 256)
Auction.sol	0.8.0	200	ed72440ed029426d462ae2 aaad9762cdad18a130bb61f7 3101bd5f78925b0b99
AuctionFactory.sol	0.8.0	200	1e3400527e6a7544fc7bc4d 58f49cea2fc45ee660f71c56 da07c2c9df37e38a1
Marketplace.sol	0.8.0	200	a91ef6ffa46f928473605b64 8688a2ca78489f84dd9ac2 20979ca745b93068f1
MyToken.sol	0.8.0	200	8dcedfa5bc1186db84693f1b 369701a0b4a5739fb0dbc7c bc44e46f977132692

Contract Name	Solc version	Optimisation	Bytecode hash (SHA 256)
Staking.sol	0.8.0	200	f6db3408cb4c396cf52333f 76930b9eb6d1b7efb5ddae7 c222bd11ef970cae8b



Get In Touch

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